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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The relationship between globalization and minorities’ discrimination remains highly 
controversial in political economy framework. The neoliberal theorists argue that 
globalization lead to growth and development which in turn generates respect for basic 
human rights and thereby lowering discrimination against minorities. While skeptics 
contend that globalization process always tends to be ‘exclusive of poor’ and increases 
inequality leading to social unrest and economic insecurity. This leads to a preconceived 
notion of threat to their survival by the minorities who perceive themselves as the losers 
from globalization policies. These negative perceptions are often used to mobilize and 
show their dissent and opposition to the neoliberal policies, allowing governments to 
resort to repressive measures. We unpack the arguments taking the perspectives of both 
sides into consideration and test several dimensions of minority discriminations under the 
conditions of globalization. 
 
We make use of Axel Dreher’s comprehensive measure of globalization index as a proxy 
for overall globalization process, followed by economic; social and political globalization 
indices capturing not only economic dimension, but also political and social dimensions 
of globalization, which is often ignored in previous studies.  Using the sample of 76 
countries for the period 1970 – 2005, our findings reveal a strong positive association 
between globalization and decline in two forms of minority discriminations viz., 
economic and political discriminations. In contrast to the arguments of dependency 
school of thought, we also find positive relationship between economic; social and 
political globalization and decline in both forms of discriminations. Of particular interest 
is the finding that these results are reiterated for a sample of low-income countries.  
 
 
Keywords: Globalization; Minorities discrimination 
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1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between globalization and discrimination of minorities is a contentious 
issue in the international political economy framework. Very often the link between the 
two is not properly understood because of the divergent views on this subject. An 
increasing amount of scholarship is likewise being devoted on general human rights 
effects of globalization, while the impact on minority discriminations is often ignored. 
The focus of this study is to examine the relationship between globalization and 
discrimination of minorities across the globe. Though there are vast number of studies 
that show a positive relationship between globalization and economic growth1, the 
consequences of globalization leading to social disarray remain highly contentious. The 
literature presents conflicting findings on this topic. The liberal theorists argue that 
countries which are highly engaged in globalization process are likely to experience 
higher economic growth, greater affluence, more democracy, and increasingly peaceful 
conditions in the home country and elsewhere (Flanagan & Fogelman, 1971; Weede, 
1995; Jacobsen, 1996). It is believed that globalization process is most likely to affect 
political violence negatively as it help improving quality of life. It help promote 
economic development, providing trade and investment opportunities creating much 
needed employment generation and reduce income inequality and poverty thereby 
leading to decline in social unrest and economic insecurity. This trickle down effect of 
decline in social unrest and economic insecurity should lead to reduction in political and 
economic discrimination which the minorities are often faced with. Thus, countries with 
higher levels of globalization process should suffer lesser degree of political violence and 
have highest number of peace years, promoting government respect for human rights and 
thereby lowering discrimination against minorities. Meaning, higher globalization 
process should not only serve in attaining development goals but also help creating peace 
and tranquility and thereby decreasing minority rights abuses. 
 
On the contrary, skeptics contend that higher levels of globalization process tend to 
generate greater economic and social inequalities. This leads to increase in economic 
insecurity and social unrest in the society paving way for the risk of political instability 
and outbreak of conflicts thereby (Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Barbieri, 1996; Rodrik, 1997, 
Rodrik, 1998; Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2000, Blinder, 2006; Summers, 2006; Krugman, 
2007). This generates a preconceived notion of threat to their survival by the minorities 
who perceive themselves are the losers from globalization policies. These negative 
perceptions are often used to mobilize and show their dissent and opposition to the 
neoliberal policies, allowing governments to resort to repressive measures.  
 
Despite these divergent views, any systematic analysis between the two is lacking and the 
empirical work is certainly underdeveloped. Thus the question whether globalization 
                                                  
1 Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995); Sachs & Warner (1995); Edwards (1998); Greenaway, Morgan, & Wright 
(1998) and Vamvakidis (1998) show through cross-country regression that trade protection reduces growth 
rates. Ben-David (1993) & Sachs & Warner (1995) show that only open economies experience 
unconditional convergence. Frankel & Romer (1999) confirm a significant and robust positive impact of 
trade on growth. Moreover, the latter study has been extended by Brunner (2003) to panel estimation and 
finds a significant positive impact of trade on income. 
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improves minority rights is yet unsettled. This is the question we try to address in this 
paper. Seeking to provide some empirical insight on this topic, we employ panel data for 
76 countries over the period 1970 – 2005 to analyze whether and to what extent 
globalization affect discrimination of minorities and its direction. Rest of the paper is 
structured as follows: next section presents the theoretical arguments of liberals versus 
dependency theorists. We introduce our measures of minority discriminations and 
globalization in section three. While in section four we explain our empirical results, 
section five concludes the study.  
 
2. Globalization & Minority Discriminations – Theoretical Underpinnings  
 
Conventional wisdom posits absence of any systematic relationship between 
globalization and minority discriminations. The theoretical literature on relationship 
between the two gives contradictory picture. There are two schools of thoughts viz., 
neoliberal and critical schools of thought. The neoliberal school of thought rallies its 
support behind globalization positively affecting minority rights, while critical school of 
thought argues otherwise. Below, we discuss how globalization can increase (reduce) the 
minority discriminations in a country.   
 
2. 1. Neoliberal Perspective 
 
The neoliberal perspective views globalization as a ‘triumph of market economy’. They 
argue that globalization provides economic, social and political benefits leading to 
increase in human rights respect and translating into lower discriminations against 
minorities. There is a vast literature which shows that wealthier countries have greater 
respect for all forms of human rights, including the rights of minorities (Poe, Tate & 
Keith, 1999 and Milner, Leblang & Poe, 2004). These wealthier countries enjoy greater 
economic affluence and economic development is higher. Historical analysis reveals that 
internal conflicts in its various forms occur as a result of economic and financial failures 
(Kamenka, 1970). Amartya Sen (1996: 16) contends that it is the friendlier economic 
policies and not the repressive political system which provides economic growth and 
development. The study by Crossette (1997) shows that globalization enables peace and 
prosperity and there by increase in economic activities. According to neoliberal 
perspective, developing countries that make use of the opportunities provided by 
globalization will quickly raise themselves from languishing in underdevelopment. For 
developing countries to prosper fully from the opportunities provided by globalization, 
avenues such as trade promotion, attracting FDI and removal of trade and investment 
barriers must be utilized. 
 
One of the important claims of advocates of globalization is that it helped removing one 
of the most important aspects of dissent, poverty and inequality, which often leads to 
discrimination against minorities. The basic objective behind initiation of globalization 
policies is to provide tremendous economic opportunities to all the people in the society 
and progress towards greater development. The globalization process is argued to reduce 
dissent and incidents of social and class conflict events because it facilitates 
socioeconomic development. A primary cause of outbreak of dissent is 
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underdevelopment, poverty and inequality (Johnston 2001; Merritt 2001; Rice 2001; 
Tyson 2001). The poor socioeconomic conditions of the minorities often lead to 
frustration, where a particular group of disaffected population shows dissent against the 
economic policies by engaging in violent activities as a solution to their problems.  The 
general consensus on the impact of globalization on inequality and poverty shows 
significant trickle down effect. The strong correlation between reduction in poverty and 
increase in income of the poorest social groups as a result of globalization was found by 
Heshmnati (2005). Similarly, improvement in quality of life and poverty reduction are 
attributed to globalization (Peimer, 2002; Hertal et al. 2003 and Kenny, 2005). Further, 
using an analysis of globalization trends in economic growth and inequality, Dollar 
(2004) finds that poorer countries have higher economic growth rate in comparison to 
developed countries and the number of global poor and inequality levels have come 
down. The literature also confirms that economic growth and development lead to 
positive impact on socioeconomic conditions (Moon & Dixon, 1985; Spalding, 1986; 
Park, 1987; Milner, Poe & Leblang, 1999; Milner, 2000; Milner, Leblang & Poe, 2004). 
Thus, as an effect of globalization, decline in poverty and inequality levels lead to 
reduction in social insecurity amongst the poorest and minority sections of the society.  
 
Figure 1: Relationship between globalization & Minority discriminations 
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study by Hegre et al. (2003) using Sachs & Warner index finds that open economies will 
grow at 2.3% more than closed economies. This increased growth in turn reduces the 
chances of conflicts by about 6% compared to closed economies. The possible negative 
effects of globalization on dissent and outbreak of conflicts may be achieved by 
promoting economic development in two distinctive channels. First, economic 
globalization one hand promotes trade and financial openness and on the other hand 
advocates for reduction in trade and investment barriers. The trade and investment 
promotion create job opportunities to all leading to decline in poor socioeconomic 
conditions (Rothgeb, 1989; Robert, 1995; IMF, 1997; Zhao, 1998). In fact Rodrik (1998) 
argues that open economies tend to produce large governments which may in turn be 
used to provide job opportunities and social policies that are minority friendly.  Second, 
as globalization involves attracting foreign and private players’ participation in the 
domestic economic activity, this obviously would have far reaching effects on basic 
welfare and development, because in order to attract the private and foreign participation, 
governments often engage in promoting better rule of law, curbing down the excess 
bureaucratic controls, controlling corruption, investing heavily in social services and 
social infrastructure related areas, promoting individual freedom. All this will in turn 
bolster the political rights of the people and ensure greater political participation.  Once 
the private and foreign participation gets into the country, apart from its numerous 
advantages, most importantly as discussed earlier, they create much needed job 
opportunities (Spar, 1998) through which the poor and vulnerable can make their living.  
 
In the recent years, the integration of Punjab (in India) and Malaysia into the global 
economy has brought growth that has helped to soothe cultural conflict of minorities with 
the state (Singh 1998, Lubeck, 1998). Thus, globalization creates much needed 
employment and business opportunities through promotion of trade and investments and 
reduction in barriers leading to decline in economic insecurity amongst the poorer and 
minority sections of the society. Obviously, when the growth and development process 
tends to be ‘inclusive’ (creating equal economic opportunities to all sections in the 
society) there will be a positive feedback from development to globalization policy 
choices and vulnerability to exogenous shocks would be less. This means lowering of 
economic discrimination against minorities. The improvement in investment perception 
of the government ensures greater political rights and political participation for all 
sections of the society, ensuring decline in political discrimination against minorities.  
 
India is often cited as an example of the positive influence of globalization process. 
During the early 1990s the government of India initiated neoliberal policies with an aim 
of integrating its economy with that of world economy. Recent history of reforms 
implementations in India shows that except few contentious issues like privatization 
program, there has been a broad consensus on the implementation of neoliberal polices 
across the political fraternity. Post 1998, India started witnessing the fruits of 
globalization policies. There is a tremendous growth and employment opportunities in 
India. In 1991, India attracted FDI inflows worth 0.45 US$ million. As of 2007, India is 
world’s fourth largest FDI destination with total FDI inflows in 2007 alone stands at 35 
US$ billion. In terms of trade openness, India was one of last countries for open trade pre 
1991. At present India is one of the Asia’s top open trade countries. Number of foreign 
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and private firms in India increased rapidly and the employment opportunities have gone 
up. As a result of surge in employment opportunities purchasing power of average Indian 
middle class citizen has gone up. The standard of living of the poor increased as poverty 
levels have come down from over 38.9% in 1988 to under 21% by 2001. Datt and 
Ravallion (1997) argued that the incidence of poverty in India had increased sharply 
during the macroeconomic crisis period in 1991, but started to decline from there on. 
Their argument is consistent with the official statistics released by the Government of 
India (2001) that shows that the incidence of poverty declined from 38.9% in 1988 to 
26.1% in 1999, the rate of decline in urban India was from 38.2% in 1988 to 23.6% in 
1999 and 39.1% 1989 to 27.1% in rural India. The decline in poverty also resulted in 
decline in inequality. Deaton and Dreze (2002) argued that India has traditionally 
witnessed lower income inequality than many other developing countries during post 
liberalization period. With respect to the minorities, the findings of Bhaumik & 
Chakrabarthy (2006) reveal that the earnings differences between “upper” castes and 
lower castes have declined in post globalization period. But, the difference between 
Muslims and non-Muslims has increased during the same period. Thus, globalization 
process has enormously benefited Indian minorities; there is scope for further 
improvement in the situation on the ground, especially with reference to Indian Muslims.  
 
2. 2. Alternative Perspective 
 
The skeptics contend the arguments of the neoliberals on globalization and minority 
rights relationship. According to them globalization hinders economic and social growth 
in developing countries. They argue that countries seeking assistance from international 
financial institutions like World Bank and IMF in the form of grants / aid / loans are often 
linked to acceptance of their terms and conditions related to free market initiatives which 
could be detrimental to overall development. This is because these neoliberal initiatives 
primarily include drastic reduction in expenditure on social sector and development 
spending on the name of budget reforms (Meyer, 1996). Because to survive in global 
competition by increasing economic efficiency often states are engaged in drastically 
reducing their budgets and onus falls on development and social sector spending. Thus, 
the states are weakened by the forces of globalization.   
 
The globalization process is marked by increase in trade, investments and capital flows 
which is made possible by increased openness of the domestic markets to outside world. 
As globalization process increases, trade and investments also keeps increasing. The 
benefits arising from globalization process is not reaped by everyone. Rather only certain 
sections of the society are often are the beneficiaries. Majority segments in the society, 
particularly poor and minorities are often the losers. As a result of the globalization 
process they find themselves increasingly alienated. If these sections of the society are 
not compensated by the government, the end result would be an ‘exclusive growth and 
development’. This leads to a preconceived notion of threat to their survival by the 
vulnerable and minorities who perceive themselves are the losers from globalization 
policies. These negative perceptions are often used to mobilize and show their dissent and 
opposition to the government’s neoliberal policies.  This is what exactly has happened in 
early years of globalization in Russia. The neoliberal polices initiated by Russian 
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Federation in 1991-1992 led to surge in growth and foreign investments. But this growth 
in trade and investments was asymmetric, helping only few Russian industrialists to 
acquire the wealth at the expense of rest of society. This led to increase in inequality in 
the society, creating a wide gap between ‘haves and have nots’ in Russia even resulting in 
rift between the regions for lesser (higher) state intervention. Those states which were 
affected disproportionately by the income gap demanded higher intervention of the state 
in terms of economic assistance. On the other hand, the states which benefited 
tremendously from foreign investments and trade started agitating against higher state 
intervention in their local economy. These divergent demands resulted in slowdown and 
in some cases halting of economic reforms (Solnick 1998). 
 
The other anti-globalization criticism is directed mostly towards developed countries 
because they according to the critics, exploit the developing and least developed 
countries to secure their dominance. The developed countries enter into the least 
developed countries in the form of foreign investments and active trade to extract the 
existing resources in those countries leaving that particular host country is disadvantaged 
position (Frank, 1979).  The second anti-globalization criticism is against the big MNCs 
operating in the developing countries. According to them these big MNCs are perceived 
to be greedy and are highly indifferent towards the social impact of their operations and 
also towards environmental degradation, labors, and consumers’ interests. Most often 
these big MNCs engage in arm twisting tactics with the local political and governmental 
fraternity by operating behind the doors and outside the democratic control in formulating 
the policies favorable to them.  
 
“…..Neoliberal ‘globalization’ is methodically biased for corporate monopoly profits 
rather than human well-being and development; the big developed country governments 
aggressively push anti-developmental economic policies, which underdeveloped country 
governments tolerate and indeed sometimes even embrace. The end result is that 
domestic productive and social welfare structures around the world are devastated with 
severe effects especially on the economically vulnerable parts of populations who are the 
most numerous…..” (The Asia Pacific Research Network, 2005).2 
 
Critics of globalization also claim that the ‘exclusive’ economic growth and development 
arising out of the neoliberal polices lead to concentration of wealth in the hands of few 
privileged groups. These privileged groups does what ever is required to keep the 
government stable enabling the government to implement these policies which are 
favorable to them. Thus, in the name of ‘globalization policies’ the governments often 
resort to eliminating subsidies, dismantling administered price controls, allocation of 
lands to industrial houses ignoring rehabilitation plans for the poor, clampdown on rural 
development and welfare spending. This uneven development and progress creates more 
gap between ‘haves & have nots’ leading to increase income and wage inequalities 
paving way for either stagnant or increasing poverty levels with the minority groups. In 
Bulgaria for example, on the name of market reforms, the land owned by the Turkish 
                                                  
2 Asia Pacific Research Network (2005) The WTO’s Decade of Human Rights Violations, APRN 
Statement on Human Rights and Trade, Hong Kong, December 10th. 
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minority and Pomaks, who were largely dependent on agriculture were redistributed by 
the government resulting in massive unemployment amongst Muslim and Pomaks 
communities. Thus, the poor socioeconomic conditions generate greater economic 
insecurity and social unrest creating hardships to the vulnerable sections of the society 
(Veerland, 2002). Rodrik (1994) argues that the consequences of neoliberal policies often 
involve the redistribution of income among different groups. If the efficiency gains from 
the neoliberal policies are not substantial and income is not redistributed properly, this 
leads to wide spread agitations to resist making substantial policy changes which in turn 
affect the vast sections of the population. However, if the governments are vulnerable to 
the reactions of certain sections of the society, which constitute significant portion, are 
less likely to carry forward the reforms process. But, if the governments remain 
insensitive, which most often is the case, it leads to angry mob protests, conflicts, strikes 
& lockouts and riots risking political instability and outbreak of conflicts thereby 
(Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Barbieri, 1996; Rodrik, 1997 & 1998; Rodriguez & Rodrik, 
2000; Fields, 2003; Blinder, 2006 and Krugman, 2007).  
 
Another argument which often voiced is against the adaptability of the state in 
embedding the neoliberal policies.  If the country fails to adapt itself to the global 
competition resulting from globalization process, it becomes uncompetitive. As a result, 
the economic hardship arising out of incompetence of the state would fall 
disproportionately on the distinct vulnerable and minority groups. The economic 
adversities lead to political grievances which often go unaddressed leading to social 
dissolution. Even if the states are concerned about the discrimination, they have lesser 
means to muddle through the problem because they are already undermined by the 
globalization process leaving violence as the only means of solution for the vulnerable 
groups. Bulgaria in late 1980s and early 1990s provides a suitable example of such 
scenario. The Turkish minority in Bulgaria were largely dependent on the employment 
generated from the tobacco industry. Previous to the implementation of the neoliberal 
policies, the state purchased the tobacco and the industry was ensured smooth 
functioning. When Bulgaria introduced market reforms, the tobacco industry was 
exposed to global trade and global competition. Due to the large scale inefficiency, the 
industry failed to remain competitive resulting in privatization of state owned tobacco 
companies. During the process of privatization there was massive layoffs and 
retrenchments leaving many Turkish minority unemployed and languishing in poverty for 
many years. This was labeled as ‘ethnic unemployment genocide’ in an attempt to revolt 
against the neoliberal polices adopted by the Bulgarian government. 
 
There is also different kind of impact of globalization on minorities as highlighted by 
Chua (2003) in what is called popularly as ‘Chua thesis’. This is based on the premise of 
‘Market Dominated Minorities’ who control the markets and has indigenous advantage in 
comparison to the majority of that country. There are many such cases in the developing 
and under developed countries. For example: the Chinese in South-east Asia, the 
Lebanese in West Africa, Indians in East Africa and whites in Latin America. When the 
neoliberal policies are implemented, these small ethnic groups who control majority of 
the markets benefit disproportionately from such policies. This means higher inequality 
and economic discrimination faced by the majority. This leads to anger amongst the 
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majority causing violent backlash against these ethnic minorities and also against free 
market economy policies initiated by the respective governments.  
 
Some of the best fit examples of adverse impact of globalization process on minority 
groups include Indonesia. In Indonesia’s 70% of the country’s wealth was owned and 
controlled by the ethnic Chinese throughout 1970s and 1980s. This ethnic Chinese group 
formed only 3% of the total population. In the 1980s when the globalization process 
picked up the pace in the country, the policies highly favored this community. Large sum 
of wealth was accumulated by them during the wave of globalization. As inequality 
between these elites and the ordinary people became wider the signs of social unrest were 
evident. This led to massive outrage against this community, which was brutally 
suppressed by the Suharto regime throughout the 1990s. But once the country made the 
transition towards democracy, the dissent against the Chinese community erupted again 
leading to full fledged violence in 1998 (Chua, 2003).  
 
3. Measuring ‘Minority Discriminations & Globalization’ 
 
Discrimination of minorities is the dependent variable of our study. Discrimination of 
minorities takes on two distinct forms. One is the economic behavior, which is designed 
by the dominant groups in maintaining economic inequalities. The second is political 
discriminatory policies, sometimes designed by the majority groups to influence 
government to make such restrictive policies. We employ two variables to capture these 
discriminations viz., political and economic discriminations indices adapted from 
Minorities at Risk3 (MAR hereafter) database. The intergroup differentials are coded 
based on political and economic status or traits of the group with respect to the dominant 
group(s)4. Both these indices are group specific for each country in each year on the 
MAR database. We computed average of level of political and economic discrimination 
indices for each country in each year. Description of both variables is as follows: 
 
i. Political Discrimination  
 
Political discrimination index is macro codings of the role of public policy and social 
practice in maintaining or redressing political inequalities. The index records specific 
kinds of political activity restricted by discriminatory policies. This index is coded on a 
scale of 0 to 4. The description of these codings is as follows: 
 
0 = No discrimination  
 
1 = Neglect/Remedial policies: Substantial under representation in political office and/or 
participation due to historical neglect or restrictions. Explicit public policies are designed 
to protect or improve the group’s political status.  
 
                                                  
3 The MAR dataset can be downloaded from: www.cidcm.umd/inscr/mar.html 
4 The MAR project states that the “differentials are objective differences between groups, as best as we can 
judge them. They are not necessarily the result of deliberate discrimination.”  
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2 = Neglect/No remedial policies: Substantial under representation due to historical 
neglect or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. No formal exclusion. 
No evidence of protective or remedial public policies.  
 
3 = Social exclusion/Neutral policy: Substantial under representation due to prevailing 
social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral 
or, if discriminatory policies.  
 
4 = Exclusion/Repressive policy: Public policies substantially restrict the group’s political 
participation by comparison with other groups.  
 
ii. Economic Discrimination 
 
Economic discriminations are also macro codings related to the role of public policy and 
social practice in maintaining or redressing economic inequalities of minority groups in 
respective countries. There are no codes for specific types of restrictions on economic 
activities. This index is also coded on a scale of 0 to 4. Description of these codings is: 
 
0 = No discrimination  
 
1 = Historical neglect/Remedial policies: Significant poverty and under representation in 
desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public 
policies are designed to improve the group’s material well being.  
 
2 = Historical neglect/No remedial policies: Significant poverty and under representation 
due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate 
exclusion. Few or no public policies aim at improving the group’s material well-being.  
 
3 = Social exclusion/Neutral policies: Significant poverty and under representation due to 
prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group 
are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset active and widespread discrimination.  
 
4 = Restrictive policies Public policies: Formal exclusion and/or recurring repression. 
Substantially restrict the group’s economic opportunities by contrast with other groups.  
 
3. i. Quantifying Globalization 
 
In all the studies in literature, globalization is measured only partially with one or a few 
economic variables like the trade ratio, direct foreign investment, net capital flows, tariff 
rates, trade restrictions, monopolization of exports, black market premiums and country 
specific globalization dummies etc. Such measures are generally known as openness of 
the economy. Subsequently more comprehensive measures of globalization were 
developed with the weighted average or principal components methods. The well known 
Sachs & Warner (1995) binary index of openness is based on the weighted averages of 
some economic variables. Others, while accepting economic variables are important to 
measure globalization, argued that globalization has also political and social dimensions. 
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The well known Freedom House discrete index of political freedom is based on a few 
such variables from the political and social sectors. The Freedom House index and 
similar measures are often used, along with a few other economic variables, as the 
conditioning variables. In practice it is hard to maintain a distinction between openness 
which is proxied mostly with economic variables and globalization measured with 
variables from the economic, social and political sectors. This remains the major criticism 
of the previous empirical works on globalization. Majority have used single dimension 
indicators like trade openness: (Doces, 2006; Martin, Mayer & Thoenig, 2007 and 
Elbadawi & Hegre, 2008) while others include both trade and investments (FDI in 
particular) as an alternative: (Li & Schaub, 2004; Barbieri & Reuveny, 2005; Solomon et 
al, 2007), which is not justifiable to quantify economic globalization. Also these studies 
have grossly ignored the social and political dimensions of globalization process. 
 
Taking these drawbacks into consideration some attempts were made to quantify 
globalization. The well known Lockwood & Redoano (2005) discrete index of 
globalization from 1980 – 2004, is also based on such economic, political and social 
variables. Similarly, Kearney, Andersen & Herbertsson (2005) using trade, finance and 
other political variables have also developed such indices for 62 countries starting from 
2000, to determine the annual rakings of countries on the basis of the Kearney index. 
Using similar such variables, the Andersen & Herbertsson index is developed for 23 
OECD countries for the period 1979 to 2000. Though these indices are well constructed, 
we have our own reservations mainly related to how economic globalization was 
measured.  
 
We do not take into consideration the indices mentioned above for various obvious 
reasons. First, Lockwood & Redoano (2005) globalization index covers only trade and 
other economic variables ignoring some of the most important facets of economic 
globalization like: quantifying trade and investment restrictions. Thus, their index without 
these important measures becomes just another simple proxy like trade openness. Second, 
with respect to Kearny index, as highlighted by Rao et al. (2008), their weighting scheme 
is somewhat arbitrary in that they do not adjust for the size of the country on the basis of 
its population. Third, it is not possible to use both Kearney, Andersen & Herbertsson 
(2005) and Lockwood & Redoano (2005) indices in time series regressions because of 
the absence of time series data. 
 
We select Dreher’s indices for the obvious reasons mentioned above. First, his 
comprehensive globalization index is used as proxy for overall globalization process 
because it also captures political and social dimensions, which are important and are 
missing in single or bi-dimensional indices. Second, regarding economic globalization 
policies his index overcomes all the three disadvantages highlighted earlier. It combines 
many economic indicators along with ‘trade and investment restrictions’ like: hidden 
import barriers, mean tariff rates, taxes on international trade and capital account 
restrictions, which no other indices captures as comprehensively as it does. Of course, the 
economic indicators in this index include ‘actual flows’, which captures: income (% 
GDP); volume of trade (% GDP); FDI inflows and inflows stock (%GDP) and Portfolio 
investments (% GDP). Third advantage of Dreher’s index is methodological as it uses 
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widely available technique of the principal components method and this index is most 
suitable for time series study as it dates back to 1970. Thus, in the light of these 
observations, Dreher (2006) is a welcome contribution because his comprehensive 
measure of globalization will help to decrease many disagreements on the measurement 
issue. The Dreher index is formulated for 123 countries from 1970 to 2005 and recently 
updated5. 
 
3. 3. Control Variables 
 
The literature shows that there is a positive impact of development and equity on human 
rights, including minority rights (Mitchell & Mc Cormick, 1988; Boswell & Dixon, 1990; 
Davenport 1995; Frey et al., 1999; Milner, 2002; Richards, Gelleny & Sacko, 2001; Sen 
1999; Kaufmann 2004; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi 2005; Blanton & Blanton, 2006). 
The models control the effects of development and growth by introducing logged value 
of per capita GDP in US$ PPP constant terms and the economic growth rate. The data for 
both these variables come from world development indicators of World Bank 2006. The 
oil exports dependency dummy was adopted from La Porta et al. (1998). The literature 
shows that the level of political regime is a key variable associated with such rights. To 
measure political regime, I include regime type data Polity IV constructed by Marshall & 
Jaggers (2002). We then follow Londregan & Poole (1996) by subtracting Polity IV’s 
autocracy score from its Democracy score, giving rise to the final democracy score that 
ranges from +10 to –10, wherein, +10 being the most democratic, +5 being partially 
democratic and -10 is fully autocratic. The study of Davenport & Armstrong (2004) show 
that democracy affects rights only at very high levels. Thus, we take the polity IV scores 
to capture for democracy levels6. Following other prominent studies in literature we also 
take into account the log value of total population adapted from world development 
indicators of World Bank 2006. The countries with higher ethnic fractionalization often 
face the risk of ethnic wars. To capture this effect, we include the degree of ethnic 
fractionalization developed by Fearon & Laitin (2003).  Prominent studies like Poe and 
Tate (1994) and Poe, Tate & Keith (1999) Dreher, Gassebner & Siemers (2007) argue 
that civil war and peace years are important determinants of basic human rights abuses. 
Taking these studies as standard, we include the dummy variable 1 if civil war exists in 
the country and 0 otherwise. We also include number of peace years for each country 
from 1970 to 2005. The peace years variable is included as the number of peace years 
since every last civil war occurred in a country. The data for both these variables come 
from the Uppsala database updated version of 2007. Poe and Tate (1994) and Poe, Tate & 
Keith (1999) argue that countries with British legal system are associated with lower 
human rights abuses to Socialistic legal system. Details about the data sources are 
presented in annexure 1. 
 
Both the dependent variables are indices, viewed as resulting from continuous, 
unobserved economic and political discrimination indices. Each index corresponds to a 
specific range of the political and economic discrimination index, with higher values 
corresponding to a higher range of political and economic discriminations of minorities. 
                                                  
5 These indices can be downloaded from http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ 
6 The data can be accessed from http://www.colorado.edu/ IBS/GAD/spacetime/data/Polity.html. 
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Since these indices represent the levels of discriminations against minorities, they tend to 
be qualitative ordinal variables, using pooled OLS regression estimation would be 
inappropriate. The estimation of a model for such a dependent variable necessitates the 
use of a special technique, namely, ordered probit method, which is set up as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
……………………………… (1)  
 
Where: i t = country “i” at time “t”; δ  = intercept; ψ = regression coefficients for 
variable “n”; ζ = error term for country “i” at time “t”. ED*it / PD*it are non observable 
dependent variables (economic discrimination and political discrimination indices), 
which are proxies for economic and political discrimination against minorities in a 
country in the year‘t’. Their positions in every year (t) depend on information available 
which represents the outcome of discrimination against minorities in a country at time‘t’. 
The hypothesis variables are globalization index; economic; social & political 
globalization indices. This empirical analysis covers 76 economies (see annexure 2) for 
the period 1970 to 2005. The pooled time-series cross-sectional (TCSC) data may exhibit 
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation problems. While these problems do not bias the 
estimated coefficients as pooled regression analysis in itself is a more robust method for 
large sample consisting of cross section and time series data. However, they often tend to 
cause biased standard errors for coefficients, producing invalid statistical inferences 
(White, 1980). To deal with these problems, we estimated for all the models the Huber-
White robust standard errors clustered over countries. These estimated standard errors are 
robust to both Heteroskedasticity and to a general type of serial correlation within the 
cross-section unit (Rogers, 1993 and Williams, 2000).  
 
4. Empirical Results & Estimates 
 
The sample of country-years that we examine in total make up of 2736 observations.  The 
results of regression estimates in assessing the impact of globalization on minority 
discriminations are presented in table 1 and 2. While table 1 deals with Economic 
Discrimination Index (EDI hereafter) table 2 includes Political Discrimination Index (PDI 
henceforth). Our globalization measures are four variables viz., Axel’s main globalization 
index; economic globalization index; social globalization index and political 
globalization index. We control for Heteroskedasticity using QML Huber-White 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. In annexure 3 we present 
summary statistics for all the variables that we employ in the regression analysis. The 
mean value for final globalization index is 42.66 per-years with a very high standard 
deviation of around 17.04.  Regarding the economic globalization index, the median 
value is 45.60. But the variance is also fairly high, with a standard deviation of 18.66. 
With respect to social and political globalization indices the standard deviations are 19.28 
ED* it /  PD* it  = δ1 + ψ2 HYPOTHESIS VARIABLES it + ψ3 Economic Growth Rate it + ψ4 log  
(Economic Development) it + ψ5 War years it + ψ6 Pace years it + ψ7 Political Regime it + ψ8 
log (Population)it + ψ9 Ethnic Fractionalization it + ψ10 Social/British Legal Heritage it  + 
ψ11 Oil Exports it  +  ψ12 Time it + ζ it 
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and 24.55 with mean of 36.28 and 48.13 respectively. In all these indices we find that 
standard deviation values are very high, suggesting that there is a very high cross 
country-variations in globalization process. With respect to EDI and PDI, the median is 
two.  The variance however is fairly low, with a standard deviation of 1.19 and 1.21 
respectively. We can also see significant cross country variations in our sample with 
regard to economic growth, development, political regime and civil peace years.  
 
In model 1 and 2 (see table 1) we find that globalization has 1% significant positive 
impact on EDI and PDI. Both indices scores suggest that on a scale of 0 to 4, zero 
represent lower discriminations and 4 represent highest discriminations. Therefore the 
negative effect of globalization suggests a reduction in discriminations. Contrary to the 
skeptics’ contention, we find that for every 1% increase in the main globalization index 
leads to 0.019% decrease in EDI and 0.029% reduction in PDI. In other words, holding at 
its mean value, increase in globalization index by its highest value (91.60 points) would 
decrease the EDI and PDI by 0.02% and 0.03% respectively. Even in the case of low 
income developing countries, the impact of overall globalization on PDI and EDI is 1% 
significant and negative (results not shown here). In model 3 & 4 we find 1% significant 
negative impact of economic globalization on EDI and PDI respectively. For every 1% 
increase in economic globalization index EDI is decreased by 0.004% and the same 
would reduce PDI by 0.010%.  
 
The findings of economic globalization and economic and political discriminations of 
minorities relationship is in contrast to the argument of the dependency theorist that 
economic globalization promotes greed over grievance and increases income differentials 
leading to societal conflicts, increasing human rights abuses and thereby minority 
discriminations. Rather we find support for the liberals’ arguments that economic 
globalization provides economic and business opportunities creating employment 
opportunities and reduces socioeconomic tensions, increasing the reduction in 
discriminations against minorities. Initiating economic globalization includes financial 
and trade openness on one hand and on the other hand relaxation of investment, trade and 
financial restrictions, the countries need to build strong macroeconomic and institutional 
framework. Failing to do so would generate a risk of economic instability. In order to lay 
this foundation, the governments often engage in framing policies to strengthen rule of 
law, promoting good governance, lowering bureaucratic hassles and corruption, allowing 
greater economic freedom and so on. All these measures ensure greater levels of freedom 
for its citizens for political participation, right to access information, freedom to form and 
join unions which give scope for increasing labor rights. Thus, economic globalization 
has far reaching implications not just on promoting the reduction in EDI, but also 
uplifting the political rights of minorities. A cautious note however is that this may not be 
true in all cases, especially with respect to some of the developing countries. This is 
because most of the developing countries today promote economic globalization without 
appropriate foundation. Some of the examples include: Venezuela, Colombia, Philippines 
and Indonesia. 
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Table 1: Globalization & Minority discriminations linear equation function: Ordered Probit 
 
 
Variables Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
Model 7 
 
Model 8 
 
 
 
Economic 
Discrimination 
Political 
Discrimination 
Economic 
Discrimination 
Political 
Discrimination 
Economic 
Discrimination 
Political 
Discrimination 
Economic 
Discrimination 
Political 
Discrimination 
Globalization 
-0.019 * 
(0.00) 
-0.029 * 
(0.00) --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 
Economic Globalization --------- --------- 
-0.004 ** 
(0.00) 
-0.010 * 
(0.00) --------- --------- --------- --------- 
Social Globalization --------- --------- --------- --------- 
-0.018 * 
(0.00) 
-0.027 * 
(0.00) --------- --------- 
Political Globalization --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 
-0.012 * 
(0.00) 
-0.014 * 
(0.00) 
Log (Economic Development) 
0.164 * 
(0.03) 
0.296 * 
(0.03) 
0.038 + 
(0.02) 
0.141 * 
(0.02) 
0.166 * 
(0.02) 
0.301 * 
(0.02) 
0.090 * 
(0.02) 
0.151 * 
(0.02) 
Economic Growth Rate 
0.009 ** 
(0.00) 
0.013 *  
(0.00) 
0.011 * 
(0.00) 
0.016 * 
(0.00) 
0.008 ** 
(0.00) 
0.011 * 
(0.00) 
0.007 *** 
(0.00) 
0.010 * 
(0.00) 
Log (Population) 
0.041 * 
(0.01) 
0.097 * 
(0.01) 
0.007  
(0.01) 
0.031 ** 
(0.01) 
0.004  
(0.01) 
0.040 * 
(0.01) 
0.136 * 
(0.01) 
0.194 * 
(0.01) 
 
Political Regime 
0.017 * 
(0.00) 
-0.023 * 
(0.00) 
0.011 * 
(0.00) 
-0.028 * 
(0.00) 
0.017 * 
(0.00) 
-0.024 * 
(0.00) 
0.013 * 
(0.00) 
-0.030 * 
(0.00) 
Civil War Presence 
0.322 * 
(0.05) 
0.385 * 
(0.05) 
0.345 * 
(0.06) 
0.421 * 
(0.05) 
0.335 * 
(0.05) 
0.408 * 
(0.05) 
0.308 * 
(0.06) 
0.379 * 
(0.05) 
Number of Peace Years 
-0.008 * 
(0.00) 
-0.002 + 
(0.00) 
-0.010 * 
(0.00) 
-0.006 * 
(0.00) 
-0.008 * 
(0.00) 
-0.002 
(0.00) 
-0.008 * 
(0.00) 
-0.004 ** 
(0.00) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
-0.872 * 
(0.10) 
-0.844 * 
(0.09) 
-1.039 * 
(0.09) 
-1.035 * 
(0.09) 
-0.939 * 
(0.09) 
-0.947 * 
(0.09) 
-0.908 * 
(0.09) 
-0.953 * 
(0.09) 
 
British Legal Heritage 
0.120 * 
(0.04) 
-0.058 
(0.05) 
0.107 ** 
(0.04) 
-0.052  
(0.05) 
0.146 * 
(0.04) 
-0.023 
(0.05) 
0.025 
(0.04) 
-0.172 * 
(0.04) 
 0.367 * -0.211 ** 0.343 * -0.194 ** 0.328 * -0.275 * 0.324 * -0.263 * 
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Socialist Legal Heritage (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) 
 
Oil Exports Dependency 
0.314 * 
(0.06) 
0.518 * 
(0.06) 
0.393 * 
(0.06) 
0.623 * 
(0.06) 
0.249 * 
(0.06) 
0.422 * 
(0.06) 
0.384 * 
(0.06) 
0.631 * 
(0.06) 
 
Pseudo-R2 0.048179 0.086998 0.040076 0.071756 0.049739 0.090413 0.048136 0.078600 
LR statistic 408.9872 * 722.0504 * 340.2010 * 595.5430 * 422.2274 * 750.3928 * 408.6190 * 652.3484 * 
Avg. log likelihood -1.476597 -1.384783 -1.489168 -1.407902 -1.474178 -1.379604 -1.476664 -1.397521 
Number of countries 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
Number of Observations 2736 2736 2736 2736 2736 2736 2736 2736 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% confidence level. The models are 
controlled for Heteroskedasticity. QML Huber/White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors & covariance are reported in parenthesis. 
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The social globalization index is associated with 1% significant negative 0.018% and 
0.027% decline in EDI and PDI respectively (see model 5 & 6). These results are on 
expected terms because social globalization not only increases the contact of locals with 
foreigners but also increases the information flow between the two. As the amount of 
contacts between the two increases, the probability of minorities and deprived sections of 
the society having information and knowledge about their state of being is also increased 
tremendously. This in turn leads governments formulating socioeconomic policies which 
are inclusive of the poor and deprived sections of the society. This helps significantly 
decrease the minority discriminations.  Finally, we also find a 1% significant negative 
impact of political globalization on both EDI and PDI. Closer political ties between the 
local government and foreign governments prompt the local governments to maintain 
positive perception of the government in the eyes of the foreign governments. Also, the 
extent of closer ties between the two can also promote better economic opportunities for 
its citizens. The political ties between India and U.S. and also U.K are some the best 
examples of this argument. Political economy literature also points out that political 
globalization are often found to enhance economic globalization process (Giavazzi & 
Tabellini, 2004 and De Haan et al. 2006). The interesting point noteworthy amongst the 
three sub indices is that the impact of social globalization on EDI and PDI are slightly 
higher than the rest of the indices (see table 1).  
 
The other interesting findings are the results of curvilinear effect of globalization on 
minority discriminations, which are captured in table 2. While there is a positive effect of 
current levels of all the globalization indices on both EDI and PDI, they have a 
significant negative effect when accelerated, which means that further acceleration of 
globalization process would help reduce minority discriminations (see model 9 & 10; 
table 2). The squared terms are significant at 1% confidence level, confirming the 
existence of inverted U-shaped relationship between globalization, EDI and PDI. 
 
The interesting finding however is the curvilinear effect of economic globalization. 
Unlike previous results, we could not demonstrate curvilinear effect relationship between 
economic globalization and PDI. As confirmed in models 11 – 12 (see table 2), we find 
curvilinear relationship only in the case of economic globalization and EDI, while there is 
no such evidence in the case of PDI. In the case social globalization index, we could not 
find any curvilinear effect relationship neither for EDI nor for PDI. This shows that 
acceleration of social globalization can be detrimental in reducing EDI and PDI (see 
models 13 & 14; table 2). Finally, we see a perfect inverted U-shaped relationship 
between acceleration of political globalization, EDI and PDI. Both the squared terms are 
statistically significant at 1% confidence level (see models 15 & 16; table 2). Thus, we 
find a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between overall globalization; economic 
and political globalization indices with EDI and PDI. 
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Table 2: Globalization & Minority Discriminations curvilinear equation function: Ordered Probit 
 
 
Variables Model 9 
 
Model 10 
 
Model 11 
 
Model 12 
 
Model 13 
 
Model 14 
 
Model 15 
 
Model 16 
 
 
 
Economic 
Discrimination 
Political 
Discrimination 
Economic 
Discrimination 
Political 
Discrimination 
Economic 
Discrimination 
Political 
Discrimination 
Economic 
Discrimination 
Political 
Discrimination 
Globalization 
0.016 * 
(0.00) 
0.007  
(0.00) --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 
Globalization Squared 
-0.0004 * 
(0.00) 
-0.0004 * 
(0.00) --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 
Economic Globalization --------- --------- 
0.023 * 
(0.00) 
-0.015 * 
(0.00) --------- --------- --------- --------- 
Economic Globalization Squared --------- --------- 
-0.0003 * 
(0.00) 
4.62E-05 
(0.00) --------- --------- --------- --------- 
Social Globalization --------- --------- --------- --------- 
-0.008 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.027 * 
(0.00) --------- --------- 
Social Globalization Squared --------- --------- --------- --------- 
-0.0001 * 
(0.00) 
-5.02E-06 
(0.00) --------- --------- 
Political Globalization --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 
0.019 * 
(0.00) 
0.012 * 
(0.00) 
Political Globalization Squared --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 
-0.0003 * 
(0.00) 
-0.0003 * 
(0.00) 
Log (Economic Development) 
0.159 * 
(0.02) 
0.294 * 
(0.03) 
0.039 + 
(0.02) 
0.141 * 
(0.02) 
0.162 * 
(0.02) 
0.300 * 
(0.02) 
0.104 * 
(0.02) 
0.161 * 
(0.02) 
Economic Growth Rate 
0.008 *** 
(0.00) 
0.011 * 
(0.00) 
0.010 ** 
(0.00) 
0.015 * 
(0.00) 
0.008 ** 
(0.00) 
0.011 * 
(0.00) 
0.006  
(0.00) 
0.009 ** 
(0.00) 
Log (Population) 
0.048 * 
(0.01) 
0.104 * 
(0.01) 
0.008 
(0.01) 
0.031 ** 
(0.01) 
0.011 
(0.01) 
0.040 *  
(0.01) 
0.137 * 
(0.02) 
0.196 * 
(0.02) 
 
Political Regime 
0.014 * 
(0.00) 
-0.026 * 
(0.00) 
0.008 ** 
(0.00) 
-0.028 * 
(0.00) 
0.015 * 
(0.00) 
-0.024 * 
(0.00) 
0.014 * 
(0.00) 
-0.029 * 
(0.00) 
Civil War Presence 0.352 * 0.414 * 0.368 * 0.418 * 0.346 * 0.409 * 0.311 * 0.379 * 
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(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Number of Peace Years 
-0.007 * 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.010 * 
(0.00) 
-0.006 * 
(0.00) 
-0.007 * 
(0.00) 
-0.002 
(0.00) 
-0.009 * 
(0.00) 
-0.004 * 
(0.00) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
-0.901 * 
(0.09) 
-0.871 * 
(0.09) 
-1.102 * 
(0.09) 
-1.027 * 
(0.09) 
-0.927 * 
(0.09) 
-0.947 * 
(0.09) 
-1.019 * 
(0.09) 
-1.044 * 
(0.09) 
 
British Legal Heritage 
0.139 * 
(0.04) 
-0.043 
(0.05) 
0.167 * 
(0.04) 
-0.061 
(0.05) 
0.149 * 
(0.04) 
-0.023  
(0.05) 
0.112 ** 
(0.05) 
-0.106 ** 
(0.05) 
 
Socialist Legal Heritage 
0.332 * 
(0.11) 
-0.251 * 
(0.08) 
0.316 * 
(0.11) 
-0.189 ** 
(0.09) 
0.322 * 
(0.11) 
-0.275 * 
(0.08) 
0.303 * 
(0.11) 
-0.287 * 
(0.08) 
Oil Exports Dependency 
0.269 * 
(0.07) 
0.472 * 
(0.06) 
0.401 * 
(0.06) 
0.621 * 
(0.06) 
0.254 * 
(0.06) 
0.422 * 
(0.06) 
0.336 * 
(0.07) 
0.590 * 
(0.06) 
 
Pseudo-R2 0.052908 0.091900 0.043568 0.071853 0.050293 0.090415 0.057142 0.084466 
LR statistic 449.1358 * 762.7290 * 369.8426 * 596.3507 * 426.9370 * 750.4038 * 485.0775 * 701.0295 * 
Avg. log likelihood -1.469260 -1.377349 -1.483751 -1.407755 -1.473317 -1.379602 -1.462692 -1.388625 
Number of countries 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
Number of Observations 2736 2736 2736 2736 2736 2736 2736 2736 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% confidence level. The models are 
controlled for Heteroskedasticity. QML Huber/White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors & covariance are reported in parenthesis. 
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We also would have included all the three globalization indices viz., economic; social and political, into one 
single model. But, neither for EDI nor for PDI we could not do so because of high correlation between the 
three indices7.  With respect to control variables, surprisingly we find positive relationships between 
economic growth and development with EDI and PDI, suggesting that increase in income through economic 
growth would increase discriminations because it leads to instability as the rebellion increases. This is 
particularly true in the case of developing countries. As highlighted by Milner, Poe & Leblang (1999) that 
increase in economic inequality leads to social unrest in the society, specially amongst vulnerable sections 
paving way for dissent against the government policies. This happens more when majority of the deprived 
sections are at the bottom of the economic ladder and when the gap between the ‘haves and have nots’ are 
very wide. In our full sample model, the positive effect of this variable is more so because out of total 76 
countries in our sample, 65 (about 86%) are developing countries. To confirm this, we ran the same model 
separately using only the 11 developed countries in the sample. We find significant negative relationship of 
economic growth, percapita GDP on both EDI and PDI. Another reason for this positive relationship is 
because of the positive impact of globalization on income. Meaning, the rise in income is more due to 
globalization than any other reason. This is confirmed when we ran the same model without globalization 
variables only to find ‘negative relationship’ between Percapita GDP, EDI and PDI. We also find that 
increase in population levels exerts positive effect of minority discriminations. This effect is consistent 
across both forms of discriminations displayed in all models (see table 1). 
 
The results related to ethnic fractionalization are also surprising as we find negative sign for both EDI and 
PDI. The other most significant finding of the study is the effect of transition to democracy. We find that an 
improvement in democracy levels is associated with lower PDI. This is a significant finding as Rodrik (1999) 
opines that democratic institutions play important role in conflict management because it allows for 
differences to be settled amongst social groups to be resolved in an inclusive and participatory manner. The 
results are robust and consistent across the board. But, we could not find the same relationship with EDI. On 
the contrary we find a positive impact of democracy on EDI, suggesting that its impact is more reasonable 
and higher on reducing political discriminations of minorities. While consistent with prominent past studies 
Poe & Tate (1994) and Poe, Tate & Keith (1999) when we introduce civil war year dummy, we find a 1% 
significant positive relationship EDI and PDI. On the contrary the number of civil peace years help reduce 
minority discriminations. The coefficient value for civil war dummy is higher than peace years, suggesting 
that the risk of civil war is always detrimental to minority discriminations. The results also demonstrate the 
positive impact of oil exports on EDI and PDI. This result is consistent with the findings of Ross (2004) who 
argue that conflicts are vulnerable to increase in oil exports dependency in developing countries. With 
respect to legal heritage, the results are mixed as we find significant negative impact of socialist and British 
legal system heritages only on PDI. The results of control variables are highly significant and consistent 
across all the models and are also free from the problem of multi colinearity (see annexure 4). 
 
 
                                                  
7 The Pearson’s correlation matrix of economic; social and political globalization indices is presented here. It shows very high 
correlation between economic globalization and social globalization. While the correlation between social and political 
globalization is marginal. 
 
  Economic Globalization Social Globalization Political Globalization 
Economic Globalization 1.00   
Social Globalization 0.82 1.00  
Political Globalization 0.30 0.48 1.00 
 
 21
4. 1. Marginal Effects of Globalization 
 
To further analyze the quantitative importance of globalization on both EDI and PDI, we calculate the 
marginal effects of all the globalization indices using the coefficients obtained in our models. The marginal 
effects help understand the impact of an independent variable would have on the dependent variable.  
 
Graph 1 
 
 
 
In this case, the dependent variables are EDI, PDI and total discrimination index (TDI hereafter) which is an 
average of EDI and PDI. All the three indices are coded with the scores ranging from 0 to 4. This implies 
that for a given change in our ‘key independent variable’ the change in the odds of the highest value of the 
respective dependent variable. Graph 1 shows how much an increase in the standardized value of all the 
statistically significant globalization variables in the models will increase the odds of an increased level of 
EDI, PDI and TDI for all the countries under study. In graph 1, we notice that overall globalization has the 
greatest impact on EDI, PDI and TDI. Since the highest value 4 represents highest form of minority 
discriminations, lower the odds greater the decline in discriminations. We see that for one unit change in the 
level of main globalization index is leading to decrease in odds of full EDI, PDI and TDI by 0.98; 0.97 and 
0.97 times respectively.  With respect to economic globalization, it decreases the odds of full respect for 
EDI, PDI and TDI by 0.996; 0.989 and 0.991 times respectively. It is noteworthy here that the marginal 
impact of economic globalization is highest amongst all forms of globalization. Meaning, its impact on 
reducing minority discrimination is the least amongst all forms of globalization. The impact of social 
globalization index decreasing the odds of all the three indices is 0.98; 0.97 and 0.98 times respectively. 
Finally, the odds of EDI; PDI and TDI decrease by 0.987; 0.986 and 0.985 times respectively for a unit 
change in political globalization. The other interesting point noteworthy here is that the impact of social 
globalization is marginally higher than economic and political globalization in order.  
Marginal Effect of Globalization on the odds of Full EDI & PDI 
EDI
EDI
EDI
EDI
PDI
PDI
PDI
PDI
Total Discriminations
Total Discriminations
Total Discriminations
Total Discriminations
0.955 0.96 0.965 0.97 0.975 0.98 0.985 0.99 0.995 1
Globalization
Economic Globalization
Social Globalization
Political Globalization
Effect on odds
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4. 2. Robustness Check 
 
We ran several tests of sensitivity. First, we ran all the results again by dividing the total sample group into 
two periods. One set includes the period from 1970 to 1987 and the second period from 1988 to 2005. We do 
not find any major significant changes in both the results, expect to the fact that the findings are more 
significant in the second period of 1988 - 20058. This might be because the globalization policies started to 
pick up the pace from late 1980s in most of the developing economies.  Second, we test our models by 
dropping developed countries from the sample. The results with respect to the impact of globalization on all 
forms of discriminations of minorities remain consistent as in our baseline model. Finally, as a part of 
sensitivity analysis, we replace EDI and PDI with TDI, which is an average score of both EDI and PDI. The 
results show that globalization lead to decrease in TDI (see annexure 5). We also find that all the three 
subindices of globalization have a significant negative impact on the TDI. Finally, we also ran another model 
by summing EDI and PDI on a scale of 0 - 89. We obtain identical results in line with the baseline model. 
 
5. Summary & Conclusion 
 
The association between globalization and minority discriminations is not only interesting but is also most 
untouched topic in the domain of political economy. On the one hand, the neoliberal perspective argues that 
globalization is important as it leads to growth and development which creates much needed job 
opportunities, improving poor socioeconomic conditions. This leads to civil peace in the society paving way 
for government respect for human rights and thereby decline in discriminations against minorities. On the 
other hand, the skeptics contend that globalization leads to scaremongering as it always benefits the affluent 
class ignoring the grievances of the majority poor and deprived sections in the society. It creates uneven 
development and progress thereby further widening the gap between ‘haves and have nots’.  As a result the 
poor and deprived sections of the society always find themselves increasingly alienated. They perceive the 
neoliberal policies initiated by the government as a major threat to their very existence leading to dissent 
against government. This often takes the form of domestic violence and conflicts, allowing governments to 
resort to repressive measures, which further increases the discriminations against minorities. Thus, there is a 
need to consider both perspectives and examine the relationship between the two. This apart, the linkage 
between the two seems to be empirically underdeveloped in the literature. Though considerable amount of 
attention is devoted on this topic in anecdotes, nonetheless there are seldom empirical studies which have 
captured and quantified the comprehensive process of globalization.  
 
In this backdrop, our work gains prominence as it gauges the effects of globalization on minority 
discriminations for 76 countries for the period 1970 – 2005. In doing so, we make use of Axel Dreher’s 
comprehensive measure of globalization indices which not only captures the economic aspects of 
globalization process, but also consider social and political facets. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that 
globalization and minority discriminations are contradictory, our overall findings show globalization leads to 
decrease in both forms of minority discriminations viz., economic and political discriminations of minorities, 
an index coded by Minority Risk Report on a scale of 0 to 4, here 4 represents highest form of 
discriminations. By gauging overall effects of globalization on minority discriminations, we find that 
economic; social and political globalization have significant negative impact of both forms of minority 
discriminations, which means discriminations tend to reduce as globalization process increases. Moreover, 
when accelerated, we find a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between the two, suggesting that 
                                                  
8 Results are not shown here due to space constraints. They will be provided on request.  
9 Results not shown here, but are be provided upon request.  
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further increase in globalization would do more good than harm for minority discriminations. The interesting 
findings of this study are that the results remain robust and consistent when we test the same for 65 
developing countries. The table 3 summarizes our findings: 
 
Table 3: Summary of our findings 
 
Variables of Interest Hypothesis Results obtained in our study 
EDI PDI TDI 
Globalization decreases minority discriminations –  – – 
Economic Globalization decreases minority discriminations – – – 
Social Globalization decreases minority discriminations – – – 
Political Globalization decreases minority discriminations – – – 
Notes: – is support for hypothesis; empty box means no statistical significance 
 
As seen in the table 3 we find negative relationship between various forms of globalization and minority 
discriminations. These results confirm the need to consider globalization not just as a single component, 
economic globalization, but rather as a multifaceted concept by including social and political dimensions. 
The results obtained in our study are the most comprehensive till date and first of its kind. This is because of 
three important reasons: first, contrary to other studies in the literature on quantifying globalization process, 
we adapt Axel’s globalization index which takes into account all the three components of globalization 
namely, economic, social and political. This apart, the economic globalization index which we consider 
captures economic variables as well as trade and investment restrictions, which is missing in the previous 
studies that often use only economic variables or single or bi-dimensional economic variables. Second, this 
relationship is tested against both forms of discriminations (economic and political) dealing with minorities 
which go much beyond to capture not only economic, but political and civil discriminations prevailing in a 
country. It is evident that globalization can effect the minority discriminations in several ways, our both 
discrimination variables, which are broad measures of minority discriminations, allowed a much more 
detailed study of the relationship between the two. Third, our study is cross sectional time series which 
includes 76 countries (65 developing and 11 developed countries) spanning over the period 1970 – 2005, 
which takes into consideration the temporal effects rather than using the data in points of time, is first such 
comprehensive study of its kind. 
 
Implications of the results  
 
While we have focused on the most contentious topic in political economy, the linkage between 
globalization and human rights, the results in this paper highlight three important points. First, these results 
show that globalization process is not necessarily confined to economic and social policies alone. Rather, it 
can also affect the most important policies like discrimination against minorities, which according to Hayek 
(1976) and Sen (1999), ‘the equity’ are the important prerequisites for welfare and growth of a country. 
Second, the impact of globalization is felt not just on reducing state terrorism and suppressing basic human 
rights, but its impact is significant even on basic rights of the vulnerable sections of the society, the 
minorities. Finally, these results also suggest that globalization can indeed act as a disciplining device in the 
hands of the governments to frame all-inclusive policies aiming at development; welfare and prosperity 
taking into board those sections of the society who feel are the losers from the neoliberal policies.  
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Annexures 
 
 
Annexure 1: Data Sources 
 
 
Indicators 
 
Data Sources 
 
Globalization index http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ 
Economic; Social & Political globalization  http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ 
Minority Discrimination indices MAR report  
Economic Growth Rate World Development Indicators – 2006, http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/WDI 
Log (Economic Development) World Development Indicators – 2006, http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/WDI 
Log (Population) World Development Indicators – 2006, http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/WDI 
Political Regime Polity IV, (http://www.colorado.edu/IBS/GAD/spacetime/data/Polity.html) 
Civil War Presence Uppsala Dataset, 2007 
Number of Peace Years Uppsala Dataset, 2007 
Ethnic Fractionalization Fearon & Laitin (2003); (online): http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/ 
British/Socialist Legal Heritage 
La Porta et al. (1998): 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/ 
Oil Exports Dependency Fearon & Laitin (2003): http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/ 
 
 
 
 
Annexure 2: Countries under Study 
 
 
Albania Colombia Hungary Malaysia Sierra Leone 
Argentina Costa Rica Indonesia Namibia El Salvador 
Australia Cyprus India Niger Chad 
Burundi Germany Iran Nigeria Togo 
Bangladesh Dominican Republic Israel Nicaragua Thailand 
Bulgaria Algeria Italy New Zealand Turkey 
Bahrain Ecuador Jordan Pakistan Uganda 
Bolivia Egypt, Arab Rep. Japan Panama United States 
Brazil Spain Kenya Peru Venezuela, RB 
Botswana Fiji Korea, Republic Philippines South Africa 
Canada France Sri Lanka Papua New Guinea Zambia 
Switzerland United Kingdom Morocco Paraguay Zimbabwe 
Chile Ghana Madagascar Romania   
China Greece Mexico Rwanda   
Cote d'Ivoire Guatemala Mali Senegal   
Cameroon Guyana Malawi Singapore   
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Annexure 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Mean  Median  Maximum 
 
Minimum 
Standard  
Deviation 
 
Observations 
Number of 
Countries 
Political Discrimination 2.34 2.00 4.00 0.00 1.19 2736 76 
Economic Discrimination 2.06 2.00 4.00 0.00 1.21 2736 76 
Total Discrimination 2.29 2.00 4.00 0.00 1.07 2736 76 
Globalization 42.66 39.92 91.60 7.14 17.04 2736 76 
Economic Globalization 45.60 44.48 96.94 7.53 18.66 2736 76 
Social Globalization 36.28 31.30 95.38 5.52 19.28 2736 76 
Political Globalization 48.13 45.55 99.00 1.00 24.55 2736 76 
GDP growth rate 3.76 3.95 35.22 -50.25 5.05 2736 76 
Percapita GDP 4777.69 1568.13 39068.18 99.70 7314.35 2736 76 
Log (Percapita GDP) 7.42 7.36 10.57 4.60 1.50 2736 76 
Population 54148199 11963458 1300000000 227724 157000000 2736 76 
Log (Population) 16.45 16.30 20.99 12.34 1.56 2736 76 
Political Regime 1.73 4.00 10.00 -10.00 7.25 2736 76 
Civil War 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.41 2736 76 
Civil Peace Years 18.27 15.00 59.00 0.00 16.80 2736 76 
Oil Exports Dependency 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.31 2736 76 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.43 0.43 0.90 0.00 0.29 2736 76 
British Legal Heritage 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.49 2736 76 
Socialist Legal Heritage 0.07 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.25 2736 76 
 
 
 
Annexure 4: Correlation Matrix 
 
 Globalization 
Economic 
Glob 
Social 
Glob 
Political 
Glob 
GDP 
growth rate 
Log (Percapita 
GDP) 
Log 
(Population) 
Political 
Regime 
Civil 
War 
Civil Peace 
Years 
Globalization 1.000          
Economic Globalization 0.862 1.000         
Social Globalization 0.935 0.822 1.000        
Political Globalization 0.688 0.293 0.476 1.000       
GDP growth rate -0.033 0.020 -0.056 -0.047 1.000      
Log (Percapita GDP) 0.792 0.695 0.778 0.486 -0.013 1.000     
Log (Population) 0.142 -0.186 -0.041 0.642 0.039 0.050 1.000    
Political Regime 0.546 0.474 0.539 0.336 -0.056 0.512 0.112 1.000   
Civil War -0.188 -0.199 -0.207 -0.051 -0.057 -0.170 0.201 0.000 1.000  
Civil Peace Years 0.449 0.355 0.447 0.311 -0.032 0.433 -0.020 0.194 -0.504 1.000 
Oil Exports  -0.107 -0.100 -0.182 0.031 0.014 0.005 0.077 -0.210 0.004 -0.046 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.175 -0.111 -0.204 -0.116 -0.011 -0.405 -0.029 -0.176 0.161 -0.359 
British Legal Heritage 0.087 0.207 0.128 -0.140 0.045 -0.029 -0.133 0.150 0.026 -0.154 
Socialist Legal Heritage -0.011 -0.029 -0.042 0.051 0.009 -0.033 0.084 -0.138 -0.134 0.261 
 
Oil Exports  Ethnic Fractionalization British Legal Heritage Socialist Legal Heritage 
1.000    
0.066 1.000   
-0.098 0.391 1.000  
-0.092 -0.246 -0.208 1.00
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Annexure 4: Sensitivity analysis - Globalization & Total minority discriminations (TDI)  
 
Variables Model 17 
 
Model 18 
 
Model 19 
 
Model 20 
 
Model 21 
 
Model 22 
 
Model 23 
 
Model 24 
 
Globalization 
-0.026 * 
(0.00) 
0.010 *** 
(0.00) --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 
Globalization Squared --------- 
-0.0004 * 
(0.00) --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 
Economic Globalization --------- --------- 
-0.009 * 
(0.00) 
-0.001  
(0.00) --------- --------- --------- --------- 
Economic Globalization Squared --------- --------- --------- 
-7.89E-05 *** 
(0.00) --------- --------- --------- --------- 
Social Globalization --------- --------- --------- --------- 
-0.021 * 
(0.00) 
-0.014 * 
(0.00) --------- --------- 
Social Globalization Squared --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 
-7.12E-05 *** 
(0.00) 
 
--------- 
 
--------- 
Political Globalization --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 
-0.015 * 
(0.00) 
0.015 * 
(0.00) 
Political Globalization Squared 
 
--------- 
 
--------- 
 
--------- 
 
--------- 
 
--------- 
 
--------- 
 
--------- 
-0.0003 * 
(0.00) 
Log (Economic Development) 
0.261 * 
(0.03) 
0.258 * 
(0.03) 
0.122 * 
(0.03) 
0.1223 * 
(0.03) 
0.234 * 
(0.03) 
0.231 * 
(0.03) 
0.152 * 
(0.02) 
0.166 * 
(0.02) 
Economic Growth Rate 
0.012 * 
(0.00) 
0.010 ** 
(0.00) 
0.014 * 
(0.00) 
0.014 * 
(0.00) 
0.010 * 
(0.00) 
0.010 ** 
(0.00) 
0.009 ** 
(0.00) 
0.008 *** 
(0.00) 
Log (Population) 
0.062 * 
(0.01) 
0.070 * 
(0.01) 
0.006  
(0.01) 
0.006 
(0.02) 
0.014  
(0.01) 
0.019 
(0.01) 
0.177 * 
(0.02) 
0.179 * 
(0.02) 
 
Political Regime 
-0.011 * 
(0.00) 
-0.014 * 
(0.00) 
-0.016 * 
(0.00) 
-0.017 * 
(0.00) 
-0.012 * 
(0.00) 
-0.013 * 
(0.00) 
-0.012 * 
(0.00) 
-0.015 * 
(0.00) 
Civil War Presence 
0.377 * 
(0.06) 
0.406 * 
(0.06) 
0.405 * 
(0.06) 
0.410 * 
(0.06) 
0.396 * 
(0.06) 
0.403 * 
(0.06) 
0.361 * 
(0.06) 
0.362 * 
(0.06) 
Number of Peace Years 
-0.004 ** 
(0.00) 
-0.003 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.007 * 
(0.00) 
-0.007 * 
(0.00) 
-0.004 ** 
(0.00) 
-0.004 ** 
(0.00) 
-0.005 * 
(0.00) 
-0.005 * 
(0.00) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
-1.079 * 
(0.09) 
-1.107 * 
(0.08) 
-1.250 * 
(0.09) 
-1.265 * 
(0.09) 
-1.190 * 
(0.08) 
-1.181 * 
(0.08) 
-1.145 * 
(0.09) 
-1.256 * 
(0.08) 
 
British Legal Heritage 
0.031 
(0.05) 
0.047 
(0.05) 
0.032 
(0.05) 
0.049 
(0.05) 
0.053 
(0.05) 
0.056 
(0.05) 
-0.089 ** 
(0.05) 
-0.007 
(0.05) 
 
Socialist Legal Heritage 
-0.067 
(0.11) 
-0.105 
(0.10) 
-0.061 
(0.10) 
-0.069 
(0.10) 
-0.119 
(0.10) 
-0.123 
(0.10) 
-0.120 
(0.10) 
-0.148 + 
(0.10) 
 
Oil Exports Dependency 
0.358 * 
(0.05) 
0.313 * 
(0.05) 
0.452 * 
(0.05) 
0.454 * 
(0.05) 
0.297 * 
(0.05) 
0.301 * 
(0.05) 
0.455 * 
(0.05) 
0.409 * 
(0.05) 
 
Pseudo-R2 0.076115 0.081118 0.063233 0.063528 0.074305 0.074588 0.073647 0.082467 
LR statistic 605.392 * 645.186 * 502.934* 505.277* 590.996* 593.248* 585.766* 655.911* 
Avg. log likelihood -1.342883 -1.335611 -1.361607 -1.361179 -1.345514 -1.345102 -1.346470 -1.333651 
Number of countries 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
Number of Observations 2736 2736 2736 2736 2736 2736 2736 2736 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% confidence 
level. QML Huber/White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors & covariance are reported in parenthesis. 
 
